Applying KAoS Services to Ensure Policy Compliance for Semantic Web Services Workflow Composition and Enactment by Uszok, A et al.
Applying KAoS Services to Ensure Policy 
Compliance for Semantic Web Services Workflow 
Composition and Enactment 
 
Andrzej Uszok, Jeffrey M. Bradshaw, Renia Jeffers 
Institute for Human and Machine Cognition (IHMC), 40 S. Alcaniz, Pensacola, FL 32501, USA 
{auszok, jbradshaw, rjeffers}@ihmc.us 
Austin Tate, Jeff Dalton 
Artificial Intelligence Applications Institute, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9LE, UK 
{a.tate, j.dalton}@ed.ac.uk 
Abstract 
In this paper we describe our experience in applying KAoS services to ensure policy 
compliance for Semantic Web Services workflow composition and enactment. We are 
developing these capabilities within the context of two applications: Coalition Search and 
Rescue (CoSAR-TS) and Semantic Firewall (SFW). We describe how this work has 
uncovered requirements for increasing the expressivity of policy beyond what can be done 
with description logic (e.g., role-value-maps), and how we are extending our 
representation and reasoning mechanisms in a carefully controlled manner to that end. 
Since KAoS employs OWL for policy representation, it fits naturally with the use of 
OWL-S workflow descriptions generated by the AIAI I-X planning system in the CoSAR-
TS application. The advanced reasoning mechanisms of KAoS are based on the JTP 
inference engine and enable the analysis of classes and instances of processes from a 
policy perspective. As the result of analysis, KAoS concludes whether a particular 
workflow step is allowed by policy and whether the performance of this step would incur 
additional policy-generated obligations. Issues in the representation of processes within 
OWL-S are described. Besides what is done during workflow composition, aspects of 
policy compliance can be checked at runtime when a workflow is enacted. We illustrate 
these capabilities through two application examples. Finally, we outline plans for future 
work. 
1. Introduction 
Despite rapid advances in Web Services, the demanding requirements of the user 
community continue to outstrip currently available technology solutions. To help 
close this gap, advocates of Semantic Web Services have begun to define and 
implement many new and significant capabilities (http://www.swsi.org/). These new 
capabilities are intended to more fully harness the power of Web Services through 
explicit representations of the semantics underlying Web resources and the 
development of intelligent Web infrastructure capable of fully exploiting them. 
Semantic Web Languages such as OWL extend RDF to allow users to specify 
ontologies composed of taxonomies of classes and inference rules. 
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Semantic Web Services can be effectively used not only by people but also by 
software agents [10]. Agents will increasingly use the combination of semantic 
markup languages and Semantic Web Services to understand and autonomously 
manipulate Web content in significant ways. Agents will discover, communicate, and 
cooperate with other agents and services and, as described in this paper, will rely on 
policy-based management and control mechanisms to ensure that human-imposed 
constraints on agent interaction are respected. Policy-based controls of Semantic Web 
Services can also be used to govern interaction with traditional (non-agent) clients. 
2. Policies and Semantic Web Services 
Policies, which constrain the behavior of system components, are becoming an 
increasingly popular approach to dynamic adjustability of applications in academia 
and industry (http://www.policy-workshop.org/). Elsewhere we have pointed out the 
many benefits of policy-based approaches, including reusability, efficiency, 
extensibility, context-sensitivity, verifiability, support for both simple and 
sophisticated components, protection from poorly-designed, buggy, or malicious 
components, and reasoning about their behavior [2]. Policies have important 
analogues in animal societies and human cultures [6]. 
Policy-based network and distributed system management has been the subject of 
extensive research over the last decade (http://www-
dse.doc.ic.ac.uk/Research/policies/) [18]. Policies are often applied to automate 
network administration tasks, such as configuration, security, recovery, or quality of 
service (QoS). In the network management field, policies are expressed as sets of 
rules governing choices in the behavior of the network. There are also ongoing 
standardization efforts toward common policy information models and frameworks. 
The Internet Engineering Task Force, for instance, has been investigating policies as a 
means for managing IP-multiservice networks by focusing on the specification of 
protocols and object-oriented models for representing policies 
(http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/policy-charter.html). 
The scope of policy management is increasingly going beyond these traditional 
applications in significant ways. New challenges for policy management include: 
• Sources and methods protection, digital rights management, information 
filtering and transformation, and capability-based access; 
• Active networks, agile computing, pervasive and mobile systems; 
• Organizational modeling, coalition formation, formalizing cross-organizational 
agreements; 
• Trust models, trust management, information pedigrees; 
• Effective human-machine interaction: interruption and notification 
management, presence management, adjustable autonomy, teamwork 
facilitation, safety; and 
• Support for humans trying to retrieve, understand, and analyze all policies 
relevant to some situation. 
Multiple approaches for policy specification have been proposed that range from 
formal policy languages that can be processed and interpreted easily and directly by a 
computer, to rule-based policy notation using an if-then-else format, to the 
representation of policies as entries in a table consisting of multiple attributes. 
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In the Web Services world, standards for SOAP-based message security1 and XML-
based languages for access control (e.g., XACML2) have begun to appear. However 
the immaturity of the current tools along with the limited scope and semantics of the 
new languages make them less-than-ideal candidates for the sorts of sophisticated 
Web-based applications its visionaries have imagined for the next decade [7; 12]. 
The use of XML as a standard for policy expression has both advantages and 
disadvantages. The major advantage of using XML is its straightforward extensibility 
(a feature shared with languages such as RDF and OWL, which are built using XML 
as a foundation). The problem with mere XML is that its semantics are mostly 
implicit. Meaning is conveyed based on a shared understanding derived from human 
consensus. The disadvantage of implicit semantics is that they are rife with ambiguity, 
promote fragmentation into incompatible representation variations, and require extra 
manual work that could be eliminated by a richer representation. However Semantic 
Web-based policy representations, such as those described in this paper, could be 
mapped to lower level representations if required by an implementation by applying 
contextual information. 
In addition to our own work on KAoS (see below), some initial efforts in the use of 
Semantic Web representations for basic security applications (authentication, access 
control, data integrity, and encryption) of policy have begun to bear fruit. For 
example, Denker et al. have integrated a set of ontologies (credentials, security 
mechanisms) and security extensions for OWL-S Service profiles with the CMU 
Semantic Matchmaker [12] to enable security brokering between agents and services. 
Future work will allow security services to be composed with other services. Kagal et 
al. [8] are developing Rei, a Semantic Web language-based policy language that is 
being used as part of the described above OWL-S Service profiles extension and other 
applications. 
In another promising direction, Li, Grosof, and Feigenbaum [9] have developed a 
logic-based approach to distributed authorization in large-scale, open, distributed 
systems. 
3. KAoS Policy and Domain Management Services 
KAoS is one of the first efforts to represent policy using a Semantic Web language—
in this case OWL3. KAoS services and tools allow for the specification, management, 
conflict resolution, and enforcement of policies within the specific contexts 
established by complex organizational structures represented as domains [2; 3; 16; 
17]. While initially oriented to the dynamic and complex requirements of software 
agent applications, KAoS services have been extended to work equally well with both 
agent and traditional clients on a variety of general distributed computing platforms 
(e.g., CORBA, Web Services, Grid Computing (Globus GT3)). 
3.1 Ontological Representation of KAoS Policies 
KAoS uses ontology concepts (encoded in OWL) to build policies. During its 
bootstrap, KAoS first loads a KAoS Policy Ontology (KPO) defining concepts used to 
                                                          
1 e.g., http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/webservices/library/ws-secure/ 
2 http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=security 
3 A comparison among two semantically-rich representations of policy (KAoS, Rei) and amore 
traditional policy language (Ponder[5]) can be found in [15]. 
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describe a generic actors’ environment and policies within this context 
(http://ontology.ihmc.us/). Then KAoS loads additional ontology, extending concepts 
from the generic ontology, with notions specific to the particular controlled 
environment. 
The KAoS Policy Service distinguishes between authorizations (i.e., constraints 
that permit or forbid some action) and obligations (i.e., constraints that require some 
action to be performed when a state- or event-based trigger occurs, or else serve to 
waive such a requirement) [4]. Other policy constructs (e.g., delegation, role-based 
authorization) are built out of the basic primitives of domains plus these four policy 
types. 
KAoS policy’s OWL definition of (Fig. 1 shows the tool to define such policies) is 
an instance of one of four basic policy classes, that is: PositiveAuthorization, 
NegativeAuthorization, PositiveObligation or NegativeObligation. The property 
values determine management information for a particular policy (for example, its 
priority). The type of policy instance determines the kind of constraint KAoS should 
apply to the action, while a policy’s action class is used to determine a policy’s 
applicability in a given situation. The action class uses OWL restrictions to narrow 
scopes-of-action properties to a particular policy’s needs. Every action contains a 
definition of the range of actors performing it. This range can be defined using any 
available OWL construct. For example, the range can be an enumeration of actor 
instances, a class of actors defining its type, or any description of the actor context 
(for instance, the class of actors executed on some host and possessing a given 
resource). The same is true for the action class’s other properties but additionally 
XML Schema expressions can be used to restrict ranges of datatype properties. 
Consequently, policy can contain arbitrarily complex definitions of a situation. So, 
KAoS policies represent policies without conditional rules, relying instead on the 
Fig. 1. Graphical interface of the OWL policy editor and administration tool: KPAT. 
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context restrictions associated with the action class to determine policy applicability 
in a given situation 
An action class helps classify action instances that actors intend to take or are 
currently undertaking. Components (such as KAoS Guards) that are interested in 
checking policy impact on these actions construct RDF descriptions of action 
instances. KAoS classifies these instances, relying on the inference capabilities of 
Stanford University’s Java Theorem Prover (JTP, 
www.ksl.stanford.edu/software/JTP). It then obtains a list of any policies whose action 
classes are relevant to the current situation. In the next step, KAoS determines the 
relative precedence of the obtained policies and sorts them accordingly in order to 
find the dominating authorization policy. If the dominating authorization is positive, 
KAoS then collects, in order of precedence, obligations from any triggered obligation 
policies. KAoS returns the result to the interested parties—in most cases, these parties 
are the enforcement mechanisms that are jointly responsible for blocking forbidden 
actions and assuring the performance of obligations. 
Representing policies in OWL facilitates reasoning about the controlled 
environment, policy relations and disclosure, policy conflict detection, and 
harmonization. It also facilitates reasoning about domain structure and concepts 
exploiting the description logic subsumption and instance classification algorithms. 
KAoS can identify and, if desired, harmonize conflicting policies through algorithms 
that we have implemented in JTP. 
3.2 Important KAoS Features 
We highlight a few important features of KAoS below: 
• Homogeneous policy representation. Because all aspects of KAoS policy 
representation are encoded purely in OWL, any third-party tool or environment 
supporting OWL can perform specialized analyses of the full knowledge base 
completely independently of KAoS itself, thus easing integration with an 
increasingly sophisticated range of new OWL tools and language 
enhancements in the future. 
• Maturity. Over the past few years, KAoS has been used in a wide range of 
applications and operating environments. 
• Comprehensiveness. Unlike many approaches that deal with only simple forms 
of access control or authorization, KAoS supports both authorization and 
obligation policies. In addition, a complete infrastructure for policy 
management has been implemented including a full range of capabilities from 
sophisticated user interfaces for policy specification and analysis to a generic 
policy disclosure mechanism. Facilities for policy enforcement automation 
(i.e., automatic generation of code for enforcers) are under further 
development. 
• Pluggability. Platform-specific and application-specific ontology is easily 
loaded on top of the core concepts. Moreover, the policy enforcement elements 
have been straightforwardly adapted to a wide range of computing 
environments, both traditional distributed computing platforms (e.g., Web 
Services, Grid Computing, CORBA) and various software and robotic agent 
platforms (e.g., Nomads, Brahms, SFX, CoABS Grid, Cougaar). 
• Scalability and performance. We optimized the policy disclosure methods such 
that response to a query from an enforcer is provided on average in less than 1 
ms. This performance is due in part to our reliance on efficient and logically 
decideable description logic subsumption and classification methods. 
Furthermore, queries can be executed concurrently by multiple enforcers, 
letting KAoS export multiprocessor machines. In rigorous evaluations in the 
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DARPA UltraLog program, we’ve found that performance is acceptable even 
in large societies of more than a thousand agents, running on a dozen or more 
platforms, with hundreds of policies. Here, dynamic policy updates can be 
committed, deconflicted, and distributed in a matter of a few seconds. Further 
enhancements to underlying reasoners and advances in computer hardware will 
continue to improve this performance.  
3.3 Beyond Description Logic for Policy Representation 
Until recently, KAoS used only OWL-DL (initially DAML) to describe policy-
governed entities and their actions. The semantic richness OWL enables in 
comparison to traditional policy languages allowed us much greater expressivity in 
specifying policies. However, we found ourselves limited in situations where we 
needed to define policies where one element of an action’s context depended on the 
value of another part of the context. A simple example is an action of loop 
communication, where you must constrain the source and the destination of 
communication so that they’re one and the same. A more complex example would be 
when we want to constrain the action to return the results of a calculation to only the 
parties that provided the data used to perform it (or to the specific entities the data’s 
providers authorized). Such an action description might be needed to specify a policy 
controlling the distribution of calculation results. All such action descriptions go 
beyond what OWL-DL can express. 
The required missing aspect of representational semantics has, however, been well 
studied under the name of role-value maps [10]. These maps should express equality 
or containment of values that has been reached through two chains of instance 
properties. The emerging standard for OWL rules, the Semantic Web Rule Language 
(SWRL, www.daml.org/2003/11/swrl), allows the use of role-value-map semantics. 
However, the required syntax is complex, and we’ve begun to think that an OWL-
based representation expressing this same semantics might be valuable for a broad 
range of uses. For instance, the OWL-S developers found the need to express similar 
dataflow semantics and developed their own formulation (process:sameValues) that 
allowed the representation of such chains, albeit with the limitation that they could 
contain only single-chain elements [11]. 
We have equipped KAoS with mechanisms that will allow adding role-value-map 
semantics to defined policy action using the KAoS Policy Administration Tool. For 
the interim, we’re basing our syntax for this semantics on the current version of the 
SWRL OWL ontology. However, the code that generates this syntax is encapsulated 
in a specialized Java class allowing later modification if the SWRL ontology changes 
or if an OWL-based syntax eventually emerges. Our classification algorithm can also 
use this information to classify action instances. This algorithm verifies if an instance 
satisfies the OWL-DL part of the action class and, if so, checks the appropriate role-
value-map constraints. For example, if KAoS needs to determine whether an 
intercepted communication is a loop communication, it would determine whether the 
current communication source is also one of the values of the property describing the 
communication’s destination. 
To perform more complex policy analyses relying on role-value-map semantics, 
we’ve begun joint exploration with Stanford on extending JTP to allow subsumption 
reasoning on role-value-map semantics. 
7 
4. Example Application Contexts 
In the remainder of the paper, we will discuss how KAoS is being extended to address 
two complementary requirements in a Semantic Web Services context: 
• Verification for policy compliance for Semantic Web Services workflow 
composition (section 5), 
• Enforcement of policies during the workflow enactment (section 6). 
In this section, we briefly introduce the application contexts that motivate these 
investigations. 
4.1 Coalition Search and Rescue Scenario 
Within the CoSAR-TS1 (Coalition Search and Rescue Task Support) project we are 
testing the integration of KAoS and AIAI’s I-X technology with Semantic Web 
Services. Search and rescue operations, especially coalition based, by nature require 
the kind of rapid dynamic composition of available policy-constrained heterogeneous 
resources that make it a good use case to describe them using Semantic Web 
technologies. Additionally, military operations usually are conducted according to the 
well defined procedure, which however have to be concretized and grounded to the 
given situation. This presents a good planning under policy imposed constrained. 
Other participants in this application include BBN Technologies, SPAWAR, AFRL, 
and Carnegie Mellon University. 
The fictitious scenario, which is an extension of the well-know collation agent 
experiment CoAX2, begins with an event that reports a downed airman between the 
coastlines of four fictional nations bordering the Red Sea: Agadez, Binni and Gao (to 
the West), and Arabello (to the East). In this initial scenario it is assumed that 
excellent location knowledge is available, and that there are no local threats to counter 
or avoid in the rescue. The airman reports his own injuries via his suit sensors. Next is 
an investigation of the facilities available to rescue the airman. There are different 
possibilities: a US ship-borne helicopter; a Gaoan helicopter from a land base in 
Binni; a patrol boat from off the Arabello coastline, etc. Finally, there is a process to 
establish available medical facilities for the specialized injury reported using the 
information provided about the countries in the region. 
Selection of these resources is constrained by different policies originated from 
different partners of the coalition. If for instance a hospital in Arabello is best placed 
to provide the facilities, due to the fact that it has the necessary treatment facilities, 
choices of rescues resources are then restricted. There is a coalition policy that no 
Gaoan helicopters may be used by coalition members to transport injured airmen. 
In addition to IHMC’s KAoS, the CoSAR-TS application relies on a variety of I-X 
technologies from AIAI. I-X Process Panels (http://i-x.info; [13; 14]) provide task 
support by reasoning about and exchanging with other agents and services any 
combination of Issues, Activities, Constraints and Annotations (elements of the <I-N-
C-A> ontology). I-X can therefore provide collaborative task support and exchange of 
structured messages related to plans, activity and the results of such activity. These 
types of information can be exchanged with other tools via OWL, RDF or other 
languages. The system includes a planner that can compose a suitable plan for the 
given tasks when provided with a library of standard operating procedures or 
processes, and knowledge of other agents or services that it may use. 





Figure 2 shows an I-X Process Panel (I-P2) and associated I-X Tools. The I-Space 
tool maintains agent relationships. The relationships can be obtained from agent 
services such as KAoS. I-X Process Panels can also link to semantic web information 
and web services, and can be integrated via “I-Q” adaptors [11] to appear in a natural 






















Fig. 2. I-X Process Panel for a Coalition Search and Rescue Task 
I-X work has concentrated on dynamically determined workflows at execution 
time, using knowledge of services, other agent availability, and so on. However, it 
also offers a process editor for creating process models (I-DE) to populate the domain 
model and an AI planner (I-Plan), which allows for hierarchical plan creation, 
precondition achievement, consistent binding of multiple variables, temporal 
constraint checking, and so forth. 
4.2 Semantic Firewall 
Another application area allowing us to validate our approach is the Semantic 
Firewall (SFW) project, developed in collaboration with University of Southampton, 
IT Innovation, and SRI International [1]1. In addition to performing standard policy 
management functions, the system will take as an input a desired client workflow of 
Grid Services invocations and verify whether the client is authorized to execute such a 
workflow in the domain controlled by a given instance of the SFW environment. 
Additionally the policy system may generate obligations in the form of grid service 
invocations. These obligations have to be executed during the original workflow; for 
instance in order to preserving provenance2 of the calculation results. In effect, the 
                                                          
1 See http://ontology.ihmc.us/SemanticServices/S-F/Example/index.html for an example 







initial workflow can be modified and amended with the policies. The resulting 
policies embedded within the contract governing the transaction will be then enforced 
by the system as the workflow is enacted. 
5. Verification for Policy Compliance in Semantic Web Services 
Workflow Composition 
As a research topic, automatic composition of feasible workflows from a dynamic set 
of available Semantic Web Services is drawing increasing attention [19]. We argue 
for applying existing technology and mapping of already developed planners input 
and output formats to the emerging Semantic Web Services Process Model standard 
(www.daml.org/services/owl-s/1.0). To this end, we are extending our 
implementations of I-X and KAoS. 
5.1 I-K-C Tool 
In the context of CoSAR-TS, we’ve integrated KAoS and I-X to let I-X obtain 
information about the role relationships among human and software actors (peers, 
subordinates, and superiors, for example) represented in domains and stored in KAoS 
as ontological concepts. I-X can also use the KAoS policy disclosure interface to learn 
about policy impact on its planned actions. This is the first step toward mutual 


















Fig. 3. Cooperation between I-X and KAoS in the process of semantic workflow composition 
The new I-K-C tool goes beyond the initial integration of I-X and KAoS to enable 
Semantic Web Services workflow composition consistent with policies that govern 
composition and enactment (see Figure 3). This approach lets I-X import services 
described in OWL-S into the planner, augmenting any predefined processes already in 
the process library. KAoS verifies constructed partial plans for policy compliance. We 
10 
 
can export the final plan, represented in OWL-S ontology form, and use it in various 
enactment systems or to guide the dynamic reactive execution of those plans in I-P2. 
5.2 Mapping the OWL-S Representation of Process to the KAoS Concept of 
Action 
The OWL-S concept of Process maps semantically to the KAoS concept of Action1. 
Unfortunately, OWL-S made a dramatic change in representing workflow processes 
in the transitioning from the earlier ontology called DAML-S. In DAML-S, processes 
were represented as classes whose instances were process executions and whose input 
and output parameters were defined as properties of those classes. Parameter 
restrictions were represented as range constraints on those parameter properties. In 
contrast, OWL-S represents processes as instances, and parameters are defined as 
instances of the class Parameter or its subclasses Input and Output, with their 
corresponding parameter restrictions defined by the value of the 
process:parameterType property for each parameter. This significant change does not 
allow for a straightforward mapping between OWL-S and KAoS concepts using 
owl:equivalentClass and owl:equivalentProperty as it had been previously possible in 
the case of DAML-S. OWL-S will define process executions as instances of a 
ProcessInstance class that refers to its process type. This approach is similar to that 
taken in the Process Specification Language (PSL) [20]. 
In order to use KAoS reasoning capabilities it is now necessary to create an OWL 
class based on the OWL-S process definition instance. This is done by changing the 
process:parameterType mentioned above to represent the appropriate restrictions. We 
are using OWL-S API2 to load OWL-S process workflows, to find all processes 
within a workflow, and then to get detailed definitions in order to build, using Jena1, 
the corresponding OWL class which is a subclass of the KAoS Action class. 
The change in the representation of the process from DAML-S to OWL-S has other 
consequences: 
• You can’t build process hierarchies at different abstraction levels using 
rdfs:subClassOf, while you can in the KAoS ontology of actions. 
• You can’t represent an actual instance of a process—a very concrete 
realization of the process. Again, in KAoS we use the instance of an action to 
describe the currently enacted event and then to find whether policies exist that 
apply to this situation. The envisioned process control ontology, announced as 
part of OWL-S’s future release, will clearly need methods to represent actual 
events and their relation to processes. 
• The process instance doesn’t represent the actual event anymore, so the fact 
that the process in OWL-S is a subclass of time-entry:IntervalEvent carried 
over from DAML-S is a self-contradiction. (OWL-S’s developers have 
promised to resolve this issue in the near future.) 
In short, the change of representation of processes between DAML-S and OWL-S 
was motivated by difficulties related to usage of classes of processes in collections 
and other issues. However, addressing this problem has created the challenges in the 
representation of policies in KAoS mentioned above. We hope that the promised 
improvements in future versions of OWL-S will help to address these issues. 





5.3. KAoS Capabilities for Analyzing Action Classes 
After KAoS extracts a particular action from the workflow and converts it to a 
corresponding action class, we examine the action to determine its compliance with 
the relevant policies in force. The process of workflow policy compliance checking 
differs from that of checking authorization and obligations of an action instance in 
policy enforcement that we described earlier. In workflow policy compliance 
checking, we’re not dealing with an action instance but an action class. So, we must 
use subsumption reasoning instead of classification reasoning - KAoS must find 
relations between the current action class and action classes associated with policies. 
Fortunately, we use this kind of reasoning to perform policy analyses such as policy 
deconfliction.8 These analyses also involve discovering relations (subsumption or 
disjointness, for example) between action classes associated with policies. 
Such analyses will often lead to deterministic conclusions - for example, that a 
given process will be authorized or forbidden or that it will definitely generate an 
obligation. Results will always be deterministic if the given action class representing 
the investigated process is a subclass of either a single policy action class or a union 
of some policy action classes, respectively representing either authorization or 
obligation policies. 
Sometimes, however, the analyses can be nondeterministic—that is, we might be 
able to conclude only that a given process instance could possibly be authorized or 
that it might generate obligations. This kind of result will occur if the given action 
class, representing the process in question, is neither fully subsumed nor fully disjoint, 
with a single policy action class or their unions respectively representing either 
authorization or obligation policies. In this case, KAoS can build a representation of 
the action class (either the class that corresponds to the portion of the action class in 
the authorization request or the one that generates a given obligation) by computing 
the difference between the current action class and the relevant policy action class. 
The algorithm is identical to the one we have previously described [3] for policy 
harmonization. However, we’re still working out how to generically translate that new 
class to an OWL-S process instance representation. 
We’ve developed a first cut of additional KAoS ontology components, enabling 
workflow annotation with the results of the policy analyses we described. The 
appropriate markup was added to the original OWL-S workflow using the OWL-S 
API and sent back from KAoS to the I-X planner. 
5.4. Example: Planning Rescue Operation under Coalition Policy Constraints 
The CoSAR-TS scenario described in section 4 is being used to test the capabilities 
just described. Each time a new search and rescue situation is undertaken; the SAR 
coordinator gathers available information about the accident and constructs an 
appropriate goal for the planner. The goal could, for instance, contain information 
about the kind of injuries sustained and the approximate location of the victim. The 
planner begins with the selection of an initial plan template that is best for the given 
situation. It then builds OWL-S profiles for each of the necessary services and queries 
the Coalition Matchmaker to learn about OWL-S descriptions of registered search and 
rescue resources. This results in the first approximation of the plan expressed as the 
OWL-S Process Model. For instance, if the downed pilot has serious burn injuries, the 
planner will ask the Matchmaker about which services are offered by the burn injuries 
treatment unit in each medical care center. Subsequently it will ask for available 
rescue resources, which can pick-up pilot from the sea and deliver it to the chosen 
hospital (i.e., Arabello). The best result is selected and the OWL-S Process Model is 
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submitted for verification. During workflow analysis, KAoS determines that there is 
an obligation policy requiring notification of the coalition commander when the 
downed pilot is successfully recovered. The appropriate process invoking the 
Notification Service available in the environment as the Web service is inserted into 
the model and returned to the planner. 
6. Enforcement of Policies during Workflow Enactment 
Not every aspect of policy compliance can be checked at planning time. Moreover, 
sometimes the possibility of buggy or malicious code requires runtime checking of 
compliance. Thus we have designed KAoS so that the policy service can 
independently enforce policies during workflow execution. The policies governing 
both authorization and obligation of clients and servers are stored in KAoS and 
checked by authorized parties. Whereas other approaches to securing Semantic Web 
Services are limited to either marking service advertisement with requirements for 
authentication and communication and enforcing compliance with these requirements 
[5] or by attaching conditions to inputs, outputs and effects of services, KAoS can 
automatically enforce any sort of policy through integration of Semantic Web 
Services with KAoS enforcers. These enforcers intercept requests to a service and 
consult KAoS about relevant authorizations and obligatiosn. KAoS is able to reason 
about the entire action performed by the services, not just about security credentials 
attached to the request. Additionally, KAoS is used to generate obligations created 
during use of the services, not just up front during initial service invocation. 
6.1 Matchmaker Policy Enforcement – CoSAR-TS scenario 
While annotation of the Semantic Matchmaker service profiles allows registered 
service providers to describe required security profiles [5], it does not allow owners of 
infrastructure resources (e.g., computers, networks), client organizations (coalition 
organizations, national interest groups), or individuals to specify or enforce policy 
from their unique perspectives. For example, the policy that coalition members cannot 
use Gaoan transports is not something that can always be anticipated and specified 
within the Matchmaker service profile. Neither would Matchmaker service profile 
annotations be an adequate implementation for a US policy obligating encryption, 
prioritizing the allocation of network bandwidth, or requiring the logging of certain 
sorts of messages. 
Moreover, the semantics of these policies cannot currently be expressed in terms of 
the current OWL-S specification of conditional constraints. Even if they were 
expressible, organizations and individuals may prefer to keep policy stores, reasoners, 
and enforcement capabilities within their private enclaves. This may be motivated by 
both the desire to maintain secure control over sensitive components as well as to 
keep other coalition members from becoming aware of private policies. For example, 
coalition members may not want Gao to be aware that the offer of their helicopters to 
rescue the downed airman will be automatically filtered out by policy. 
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6.2 Generic Semantic Web Service Enforcer 
We have defined enforcers that intercept SOAP messages from the Matchmaker and 
filter results consistent with coalition policies. In our CoSAR-TS demonstration, these 
policies prevent the use of Gaoan resources. 
Our implementation of a SOAP-enabled enforcer is capable of understanding 
arbitrary Semantic Web Service invocations so it can apply appropriate authorization 
policies to them. Additionally, it is equipped with a mechanism to perform obligation 
policies, which will be in the form of other Web Service invocations. For instance, an 
obligation policy may require the recording of certain kinds of service transactions 
through a logging service. 
7. Conclusions 
KAoS provides necessary capabilities to verify and enforce user-defined policy in the 
automatic process of planning and executing workflows of semantically described 
processes in the area of processes building such workflows. Future work will 
investigate how to take a context surrounding the process (i.e., processes and control 
constructs) in a given workflow into account. 
Currently, KAoS is able to analyze OWL-S encoded workflows, however it can be 
extended to understand other form of descriptions (e.g., WSMO (Web Service 
Modeling Ontology)1) that share similar concepts of basic process and workflow 
composition abstractions. 
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